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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THALDA L. BAKER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ARCHIBALD H. COOK and 
MAYH. COOK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8550 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant in her brief has made a statement of 
facts which is held to be sufficient for the purpose of this 
appeal, generally speaking. However, in the discussion 
which follows of the various points herein, we have mar-
shalled pertinent facts in the nature of a supplement to 
appellant's statement. To avoid unnecessary repetition 
these facts are not set out under this heading. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDINGS OF LOSS OF EARNINGS. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUB-
MITTING PROPOSITIONS ONE TO FOUR 
INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY, AND THE DE-
FENDANT, HAVING FAILED TO MAKE ANY 
TIMELY EXCEPTION THERETO, CANNOT 
NOW COMPLAIN. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S 
ANSWER TO PROPOSITIONS TWO AND 
FOUR WAS NOT ERRONEOUS. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY 
THE DEFENDANT'S THEOR.Y OF THE 
CASE. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE 
JURY AFTER THEY HAD RETURNED 
THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSITION NO. 
FI\tE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDINGS OF LOSS OF EARNINGS. 
As a result of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff 
on August 20, 1953, it was necessary for her to have two 
operations on her back. ( R. 56, 57, 65) The first opera-
tion was performed on October 20, 1953 and consisted of 
doing what is known as a lamenectomy. (R. 57) The sec-
ond operation was performed on December 16, 1954 
(R. 59) and consisted of a fusion of the spine. (R. 63) Dr. 
Burke M. Snow, the orthopedic surgeon that operated on 
the plaintiff, testified that this type of surgery was very 
painful and that it usually takes approximately three 
months following the surgery before light work can be 
done and from six months to a year before heavy work 
can be done. (R. 71) The doctor further testified that the 
plaintiff, as a result of the injury and resulting operations 
suffered a 20 per cent permanent partial disability. The 
plaintiff testified that she was unable to even do her 
housework from the period from the date of the injuries, 
August 20, 1953, to her first operation (R. 39), and that 
between the t-\vo operations, October 20, 1953, and De-
cember 16, 1954, she was not able to do any work of any 
kind. (R. 41) The plaintiff further testified that at the 
time of the trial she was still having difficulties with pain 
and numbness in her back and legs, which restricts her 
working ability, and requires her to wear a metal brace 
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on her back all the time, except when she IS in bed. 
(R. 42, 43) 
The plaintiff testified at length about her employment 
record and the type of work she had done, commencing 
with her first job in 1938 up to the time of her injury. 
(R. 13, 21) This testimony revealed that although the 
plaintiff had a variety of jobs, she had been fairly con-
tinuously employed from 1942 (R. 14, 15) up to the time 
of the injury. In order to establish a basis for an award 
to the plaintiff for the loss of earnings that she has suf-
fered as a result of her injuries and operations, the plain-
tiff testified that her average annual income for the three 
years preceding her injuries was about $2300.00 a year. 
( R. 12, 23) This evidence is, of course, entirely proper 
and frequently used as a basis for such an award. See 15 
Am. Jur. 500. 
Defendant contends that ''in view of her own state-
ments as to having been unemployed for three months 
preceding the accident, such yearly income figures are 
without probative value as to her loss of income since the 
accident.'' This would seem to imply that unless a per-
son has been continuously employed, no loss of earnings 
\vould ever be proved. This, of course, is not the law. In 
the case of Mobley v. Garcia, (N. 11.) 217 Pae. (2d) 256, 
the court sustained an a "Tard for loss of earnings to the 
plaintiff, although she 'vas not working at the time of the 
injury, having temporarily quit her employment for per-
sonal reasons. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not so tes-
tify. She testified that her last steady work prior to her 
injuries had been at the Master Cleaners and that she 
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left there 1\iay 30, 1953, but that she did housework for 
various people following her employment at the Master 
Cleaners up to August 20, 1953, the date of the injury. In 
fact, she had placed an ad in the paper to obtain more 
work (R. 97) 
Defendant cites only two cases under her Point No. 1, 
both Utah cases, which state that if a finding is so plainly 
unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting 
fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it cannot 
stand. It is submitted that the evidence of plaintiff's his-
tory of her varied, yet continuous employment for many 
years, the severe nature of her injuries, and her testimony 
of her annual average income for three years before the 
injury, clearly provide substantial evidence to support the 
award of $2500.00 for loss of earnings from August 20, 
1953, to March 28, 1956, the date of the trial. 
POINT TWO 
rrHE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUB-
MITTING PROPOSITIONS ONE TO FOUR 
INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY, AND THE DE-
FENDANT, HAVING FAILED TO MAKE ANY 
TIMELY EXCEPTION THERETO, CANNOT 
NOW COMPLAIN. 
This Court has held in the case of Cooper v. Evans, 
262 Pac. (2d) 278, 1 Ut. 2d 68, that Rule 51 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which require that an 
objection to instructions be made or no error thereon 
may be assigned applies also to special interroga-
tories. In that case the court did consider the inter-
rogatory, although no objection had been made, be-
cause it was found that the complaining party did 
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not waive her objection as she had been afforded 
:rio opportunity to object to the interrogatory. In the 
present case the defendant did have such an opportunity 
to object and did not make any objection of any kind con-
cerning the error claimed in appellants' Point Two. Prior 
to instructions from the court, and arguments of counsel, 
counsel for both sides agreed to take their exceptions 
after the jury had retired. (R. 171) Mr. Rex Hanson, 
counsel for the defendants, took a general exception to 
the court's submitting "the issue of the defendant's neg-
ligence to the jury under the special verdict,' but he did 
not except in any way to the form or wording of the spe-
cial verdict, nor did he specifically except to Proposition 
No.1. (R. 178) 
In Dimick v. Utah Fuel Co., 164 Pac. 872, 49 Ut. 
430, this court held that where an exception is taken 
to only a portion of an instruction, the court on appeal 
cannot consider complaints of other portions thereof. 
The reasons for the requirement, that a timely and 
sufficient objection be taken to the court's charge, are 
stated in the case of Marks v. Thompson, 27 Pac. 6, 
7 Ut. 421, and Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 
v. Allen Oil Co. (Utah) 258 Pac. (2d) 445. This court 
there said that exceptions should be made and pointed out 
before the verdict of the jury is reached, so that the judge 
may have an opportunity to correct any errors which he 
may have inadvertently fallen into during the hearing 
and perplexitities of the trial and that the objection 
should be specific enough to give the trial court notice of 
every error in the instruction which is complained of 
on appeal. 
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The rule that if no exception is taken to the giving 
of instructions, no error can be assigned thereon, has been 
repeatedly stated by this court. See Hadra v. Utah Nat'l 
Bank, 35 Pac. 508, 9 Ut. 412, Dimick v. Utah Fuel Co., 
supra, Morgan, v. Child, Cole t:t Co., 213 Pac. 177, 61 Ut. 
448; Straka v. Voyles, 252 Pa.c. 667, 69 Ut. 123; Schu-
bach v. American Surety Co. of New York, 273 Pac. 
97 4, 73 U t. 332. Although these cases all involve 
alleged error in instructions the court has indica ted that 
the same rules would apply to special verdicts. See 
Cooper v. Evans, supra. The only exception to this rule, 
requiring a timely and sufficient objection, is where there 
exists in the case sure persuasive reason which invokes 
the discretion of the court to extricate a person from a 
situation where some gross injustice or inequity would 
otherwise result. See McCall v. Kendrick, 274 Pac. (2_d) 
962, 2 U t. 2d 364, where this court recited this exception 
and stated that the burden of showing special circum-
stances which would warrant a departure from the 
rules rests upon the party seeking to vary it. It is 
submitted that the appellant herein has not met this 
burden in any manner. The special v~rdict form and 
wording of the special verdict were acceptable to 
the appellant at the time they were given and did 
not become unacceptable until it was determined that 
she was the losing party. If it was unacceptable to the 
appellant at the time and she believed that it was im-
proper, it would seem that her silence and failure to 
object was for the purpose of having reversible error in 
the record as insurance against defeat. In either event, 
it wuld be unjust and inequitable to the plaintiff respqnd-
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ent to permit the appellant to complain for the first time 
on appeal. See also 89 C. J. S. 347. 
Assuming merely for the sake of argument that 
appellant has a right on appeal to complain about the 
special verdict on the two grounds set forth in her Point 
Two, it is submitted that there was no prejudicial error 
in the special verdict to justify a reversal. As to a ppel-
lants' ground one, that Proposition 1 of the special ver-
dict, as drawn, assumed facts in dispute, it is submitted 
that as the propositions called for a true or false answer, 
it was inevitable to assume facts in order to put forth 
this type of proposition. It must be admitted that Propo-
sition No. 1 combined two questions of fact: (1) whether 
or not the defendants furnished a defective ladder and 
(2) whether or not the defendants were negligent in so 
furnishing a defective ladder. The jury found that both 
were true. The language of Proposition 1 is clear and 
concise and obviously requires such a conclusion. 
In 53 Am. Jur. at page 757 it is said: 
''A special verdict should be construed reasonably 
and fairly, ·w·ithout heed to slight defects and 
subtle and refined distinctions .... If taken as a 
whole, a finding legitimately supports the judg-
ment, it V\rill be upheld. However, the law favors 
special verdicts and \Yill sustain them whenever 
it can be done consistently \Yith the rules by 
"' hich they are governed.'' 
As stated in Cooper Y. Evans, supra, the interroga-
tories are to be understood in light of the instructions. 
The court in its instructions No. 10 and 11 carefully and 
properly defined negligence and the duties of the defend-
ants in this ease. Vie'\\ring Proposition No. 1 in light of 
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these instructions, it appears that the jury was fully in-
formed and advised so that they could and did properly 
answer Proposition No. 1, which found that the defend-
ants furnished a defective ladder to the plaintiff and were 
negligent in so doing. 
The appellant relies on several Wisconsin cases to 
support her contention that the wording of Proposition 
No. 1 assumes facts in dispute. The leading case cited by 
appellant, Maas v. W. R. Arthur & Co., 239 Wis. 581, 2 
N. W. (2d) 238, was a case where the court inquired of the 
jury whether the defendant was negligent (a) in attempt-
ing to overtake and pass the car ... at the intersection. 
This question called for a yes or no answer and was not 
an affirmative statement calling for a true or false answer 
as was the Proposition No.1 submitted in this case. The 
Court held that the form of the question assumed the car 
was passing at the intersection was improper. The Court 
did not say that this was erroneous as amounting to a 
comment on the evidence, as stated in the appellants' 
brief, but did say that the question should have read 
"Was the driver negligent in respect to passing at an 
intersection.'' 
In Hoffman v. Heinke,. 268 Wis. 489, 67 N.W. (2d) 
871, the statement on the question was dictum, because the 
appellant had not properly preserved the question raised 
by motions after the verdict. The Foemnel v. Mueller 
case, 255 Wis. 277, 38 N. W. (2d) 510, is another case 
where the court ,as in the Maas case, supra, asked the 
jury for a yes or no answer; and according to the court, 
assumed by the form of the question the ultimate fact. 
The court stated that the lower court ''should have sub-
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mitted the direct question whether 'Mueller was negligent 
in stopping without placing such fuses or flares' and 'the 
direct question whether Mueller was negligent in failing 
to have clearance lights burning.' '' 
The appellant further complains that the real issue 
was not submitted to the jury, namely, whether the lad-
der introduced in evidence was the ladder used by plain-
tiff. It is submitted that this was not an ultimate issue 
at all, and that the only ultimate issues as far as the de-
fendant was concerned were whether the defendant 
negligently furnished a defective or suitable ladder to 
the plaintiff. This was placed in direct consideration by 
Proposition No. 1. 
As to defendant's second ground for obpjection to 
the four propositions, namely, that as drawn, the propo· 
sitions enable the jury to evade their duty and still return 
answers to the questions, it is respectfully submitted that 
this is not at all the case. The trial judge in this case 
has done considerable pioneer work in this state in the 
use of special interrogatories and special verdicts. 
He has developed this third possible answer as a 
means to remove some of the problems and perplexi-
ties that face juries in deciding ultimate questions 
of fact. The court's Instruction No. 10 advised the 
jury that ''unless such negligence is established by a pre-
ponderence of all of the evidence, you cannot find that it 
exists. The answer made was clearly intended to show 
a finding of a failure to prove the fact by the party 
having the burden thereon. It was so understood by court 
and counsel, and once again we point out that no timely 
10 
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objection was made to such form of answer by appellant. 
All of the four propositions had the same three possible 
answers: true, false or unable to say. Thus the appellant 
was not prejudiced nor the respondent favored thereby. 
Under the court's instructions, the answer, "unable to 
say," did decide the issues and did constitute a finding 
sufficient to enable the court to properly render a judg-
ment thereon. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S 
ANSWER TO PROPOSITIONS TWO AND 
FOUR WAS NOT ERRONEOUS. 
The special verdict submitted by the court to the 
jury as pointed out heretofore, provided that they could 
give one of three answers to each of the four proposi-
tions-True, False, or Unable to Say. The appellant was 
fully aware of the interpretation which the court intended 
to give to the answer "unable to say," namely, that the 
party having the burden of proof on the proposition so 
answered, had failed to sustain such burden and yet the 
appellant did not make any objection or exception to the 
submission of the special verdict in this manner until the 
jury had answered the propositions in a manner unfavor-
able to the appellant. As pointed out in respondent's 
Point II, the law requires that timely, sufficient exception 
be made to a special verdict the same as required to the 
court's instructions in order that an appeal can be taken 
thereon. See Cooper v. Evans, supra. The authorities 
cited in Point II, showing the necessity for a timely, suffi-
11 
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cient exception to a special verdict are also controlling 
here. 
Assuming that the appellant had made a timely, 
proper exception to the answers provided for in the spe-
cial verdict, it is respectfully submitted that the court's 
submission to the jury of the propositions with the third 
alternative answer of "unable to say" was not error. As 
admitted by the appellant, the weight of authority in this 
country is that when a jury answers an interrogatory as 
they did to Propositions Two and Four in this case, that 
the court finds, as was done in this case, that the party 
having the burden on the proposition submitted had 
failed to sustain the same. The authorities that so hold 
do so even when the jury is directed to return a true or 
false, or yes or no, answer to the proposition. See 53 Am. 
Jur. 748, Sec. 1079; 89 C. J. S. 315, Sec. 559, and 76 A.L.R. 
1145. 
It should be pointed out and clearly understood 
that the appellant's contention in her Point No.3 is mis-
leading and incorrect. The appellant contends that the 
jury failed to answer Propositions Two and Four. This 
was not the case, of course, for the jury answered these 
propositions "\vith the third alternative answer provided 
by the court. They answered that they '""ere unable to 
say that the affirmative propositions submitted were true 
or false. In other 'vords that there had not been suffi-
cient evidence presented in the case vrhich afforded them 
a basis for saying that it was true that plaintiff vras con-
tributorily negligent and that such negligence proxi-
mately caused her InJUries or that it was false. The 
12 
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court's instruction No. 2 advised the jury upon the 
burden of proving negligence and contributory negligence 
and the effect of a failure to sustain this burden. This 
answer was clearly proper and in conformity with the law. 
The appellant claims that courts in Texas have uni-
formly held in accord v,rith her contention in Point No. 3 
and cities certain cases. In all of these cases the court 
in its charge categorically directed the jury to return a 
yes or no answer to the questions. In all of these cases, 
except Goggan v. Wells Fargo & Co. (C. C. A. Tex. 1920) 
227 S. W. 246, the jury reported that they were unable 
to agree on an answer, or else failed to make any answer. 
The other few cases cited by appellant were also cases 
where the court directed an affirmative or negative 
answer and the jury could not agree. As acknowledged 
by appellant these cases represent a minority view of 
even the situation where the jury fails to agree or does 
not answer. It is respectfully submitted that they are not 
in point and are no authority for the situation found in 
this case where the jury agrees on an answer authorized 
by the court in its charge. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY 
THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE 
CASE. 
Appellant contends that plaintiff's injuries were due 
solely to her own negligence. Appellant admits that she 
does not have any knowledge as to what plaintiff's negli-
gence consisted of and, of course, there was no evidence 
13 
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in the trial of any specific negligent conduct by the plain-
tiff. It is submitted that the issue of negligence raised 
by the evidence was whether the defendant negligently 
furnished plaintiff a defective ladder with which to per-
form her work and if so was this a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries. The appellant denied furnishing 
such a defective ladder and asserted that the plaintiff 
was herself negligent which caused in whole or 
in part her injuries. There was no evidence in the rec-
ord that the plaintiff" slipped and fell" from the ladder 
or that "she failed to set the ladder up properly and it 
tipped over,'' thus no instructions or interrogatories 
could have been submitted on such contentions or 
theories. 
Appellant contends that the court should have sub~ 
mitted interrogatories to the jury as requested in her 
requested Instruction No. 2, namely, as to whether the 
ladder introduced in evidence (defendant's Exhibit 24) 
was the ladder used by the plaintiff; and if it was, whether 
it collapsed. It is submitted that these are not ultimate 
facts, but are evidentiary facts, which if submitted would 
merely require the jury to give their views on the evi-
dence. Such questions would not be proper. See 53 Am. 
Jur. 743, Section 1072 and 89 C. J. S. 247, Sec. 532. The 
ultimate fact was not what ladder 'Yas used and did a 
certain one collapse, but was the ladder furnished defec-
tive and did this defective condition cause the plaintiff's 
injuries. If these facts nre found, together 'vith the fact 
that the defendant knew or should have known of the 
defective coindition, then the defendant could be respon-
sible for any injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result 
14 
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thereof, unless she was contributorily negligent. Proposi-
tions One and Three properly submitted these ultimate 
facts to the jury and their answer resolved these facts 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
It is unquestionably the law as quoted by the appel-
lant, that it is the duty of the trial court to cover the 
theories of both parties in his instructions, provided, 
of course, that the theories have been properly raised by 
the pleadings and the evidence. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the court's instructions No. 11 and 12, to-
gether with the propositions propounded in the special 
verdict, adequately and properly covered the issues in 
this case and the theories of the parties which were sup-
ported by the evidence. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE 
JURY AFTER THEY HAD RETURNED 
THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSITION NO. 
FIVE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The defendant claims that the trial court "by adroit 
cross-questioning led the jurors,'' and by commenting on 
questions which counsel for the defendant wished to have 
asked, the court nullified the effect of such questions be-
fore asking them, thereby making ''the result a foregone 
conclusion." This implication, that the trial court favored 
the plaintiff over the defendant and in effect maneuvered 
and led the jury into giving the plaintiff a verdict, is 
false and completely untrue. 
The defendant points to certain questions of the 
court to the jury found on pages 186 to 192 of the rec-
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ord. This portion of the record c.overed proceedings 
after the jury had returned from answering all of the 
propositions, including No. 5 on damages. In order to 
get the complete picture of the court's absolute fairness 
and impartiality in his questioning of the jury it is 
necessary to examine the record on pages 181 to 185 as 
well as 186 to 192, the pages pointed out by the defend-
ant. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the court's 
question to the jury as to whether there was a prepond .. 
erance of the evidence on the question of plaintiff's con· 
tributory negligence, so that they could answer true or 
false to Proposition Two, was absolutely fair and com-
pletely clear. ( R. 182 and 183) 
In effort to nullify the findings in favor of the plain-
tiff, the defendant's counsel objected to the court's 
interpretation of the jury's answer to Proposition two, 
namely, that they were unable to say from the evidence 
whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. Defense counsel suggested that this answer did 
not necessarily indicate that the jury found that the de-
fendant had not sustained her burden of proof, but that 
it might mean that they did not understand the wording 
of the question. It is submitted that from the court's 
prior questioning and the jury's answers thereto, no 
such contention was justified. (R. 181, 182, 183) Despite 
the remoteness of any possibility that defendant's con-
tention was justified, the Court to be absolutely fair and 
careful, proceeded to question the jurors again con-
cerning this remote possibility, on their return from 
ans,vering Proposition No. 5 relative to damages. It is to 
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this portion of the court's questioning that defense 
counsel takes exception. 
It is respectfully submitted that an examination of 
the trial court's questions to the jury (R. 181, 192) 
clearly shows that the court was careful, prudent, fair 
and impartial. The court has, in its discretion, the right 
to examine the jury on its answers to a special verdict. 
See 53 Am. Jur. 739, Sec. 1067. This practice is proper 
with or without the consent of the parties, provided that 
it is done with caution. 
Defendant complains that by commenting on ques-
tions "\vhich counsel for the defendant wished to have 
asked, the Court nullified the effect of such questions be-
fore asking them. (R. 190) It is respectfully submitted 
that this was not the case. Written answers to interroga-
tories cannot be modified by oral answers to questions 
put to the jury by the Court, nor is the Court bound to 
receive every fact which the jurors desire to state, 53 
Am. Jur. 739, Section 1067. Thus the Court was entirely 
in order in limiting the jurors' comments to the question 
which he put to them. 
The careful impartiality of the trial judge is also 
clearly apparent at page 180 of the record where he 
answered the jury's question concerning the legal effect 
of certain answers to the propositions presented to them. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff in conclusion earnestly submits that 
the judgment of the District Court was lawful and proper 
for the following reasons. 
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One: There is sufficient competent evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding of loss of earnings. 
Two: The Cou.rt did not err in submitting Proposi-
tions One to Four, inclusive, to the jury and the defend-
ant having failed to make any timely exception, thereto, 
cannot now complain. 
Three: The Court's ruling on the jury's answer to 
Propositions Two and Four was not erroneous and the 
appellant because of her failure to make a timely objec-
tion to the special verdict cannot now complain. 
Four: The Court did not err in failing to submit the 
defendant's theory of the case as set forth in defendant 
Point IV. 
Five: The Court's questioning of the jury after they 
had returned their answer to Proposition No. 5 was not 
error. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is most respectfully 
urged by the respondent that the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court entered on the jury's special \erdict be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
J\tiAS YANO 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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